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A Robust Smart Card Based Anonymous User
Authentication Protocol for Wireless Communications

Abstract
Anonymous user authentication is an important but challenging task for
wireless communications. In a recent paper, Das proposed a smart card
based anonymous user authentication protocol for wireless communications.
The scheme can protect user privacy and is believed to be secure against a
range of network attacks even if the secret information stored in the smart
card is compromised. In this paper, we reanalyze the security of Das’ scheme,
and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against impersonation attacks.
We then propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for wireless communications. Compared with the existing schemes,
our protocol uses a different user authentication mechanism which does not
require different entities to maintain a synchronized clock. We show that the
proposed new protocol can provide stronger security and better efficiency
and scalability than previous schemes.
Keywords: Remote user authentication; Mobile computing; Security;
Smart card; User anonymity; Wireless network
1. Introduction
In recent years, with the fast development of mobile technologies, wireless networks have become widely available and interconnected. Remote user
authentication is a fundamental research problem in wireless network security. When the mobile users (MU) roams into a foreign network, the Foreign
Agent (FA) authenticates the roaming user with the help of the user’s Home
Agent (HA) [1, 7, 8].
As user privacy becomes a notable security issue in wireless communications, it is desirable to keep mobile users’ identities anonymous in the remote
user authentication process [12]. A lot of research work (e.g. [13, 6, 11, 2,
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4, 9]) has been done in the design and analysis of anonymous user authentication protocols for wireless communications. However, most of the existing
protocols were broken shortly after they were proposed, which shows the
non-trivialness of the task.
In a very recent paper [3], Das showed the security weaknesses in some
previous smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols. He
then proposed a new scheme which is believed to be secure against a range
of network attacks. However, in this paper, we show that there is also a
serious security flaw in Das’ anonymous user authentication scheme: an attacker who has stolen a user’s smart card can successfully impersonate the
user without knowing other secrets (such as the identity or password) of the
user. Moreover, we show that Das’ scheme cannot provide the strong replay
resistance property which is claimed to be an advantage of his scheme over
previous schemes.
We then propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for wireless communications. Our protocol makes use of a user
authentication mechanism which is different from the previous approaches
and can successfully prevent different kinds of network attacks. In addition,
the proposed scheme can achieve better efficiency and scalability compared
with other smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Das’s
scheme. Then we show its weaknesses in Section 3. We then present our
new protocol in Section 4 and analyze its security in Section 5. We compare
the Performance of our new protocol with the previous schemes in Section 6.
The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Review of Das’s scheme
Let G = Zp denote a multiplication group and g a generator of G with
order q, where p and q are large primes such that p = 2q + 1. The HA
randomly selects a private key SHA = c ∈ Zq and computes the public
key PHA = g c mod p. Similarly, the foreign agent FA selects a private key
SF A = e ∈ Zq and computes the public key PF A = g e mod p. We summarize
the notations used throughout the paper in Table 1.
Das’ smart card based anonymous authentication scheme consists of four
phases, namely registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and
password change phase. We only review the first three phases.
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MU
IDM U
P WM U
HA
IDHA
FA
IDF A
N
ctrM U
SKA,B
H(·)
EK [M ]
DK [C]
SignSK [M ]

The mobile user
Identity of MU
Password of MU
Home agent of MU
Identity of HA
Foreign agent of MU
Identity of FA
master secret key of HA
A counter maintained by MU
Session key shared between A and B
A secure collision-free one-way hash function
Encrypting a message M using a symmetric key K
Decrypting a ciphertext C using a symmetric key K
Signing a message M using a private key SK
Table 1: Notations

2.1. Registration phase
Step1. The MU chooses his/her own identity IDM U and password P WM U ,
and generates a large random number d. Then he/she computes the hash
value f = H(IDM U ⊕ P WM U ⊕ d), and sends the registration message
IDM U , f to the HA over a secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the message from IDM U , the HA computes T KM U =
H(N kIDM U ) ⊕ f using its own secret master key N , and r = IDHA ⊕
EN [IDM U km], where m is a random value which is different for each mobile user MU. The HA then issues a smart card to M U which contains
(T KM U , H(·), r) over a secure channel.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, the MU securely stores d, f in the
smart card. Hence, the smart card would contain (T KM U , H(·), r, d, f ).
2.2. Login phase
Step1. The MU first inserts his/her smart card into the device and then
∗
enters his/her identity IDM U and password P WM
U . The smart card then
∗
∗
computes f = H(IDM U ⊕P WM U ⊕d) and verifies the equation f ∗ = f using
the stored value of f . If the equation holds, proceed to Step 2. Otherwise,
the login phase is terminated immediately.
3

∗
Step2. The smart card computes the value T KM
U = T KM U ⊕f = H(N kIDM U ).
The smart card then acquires the current timestamp TM U and generates a
random nonce RNM U . It further computes the followings: A = g a mod p, F =
EL [TM U , RNM U , IDF A , A], M = EDH [r], where L = H(TM U ⊕ RNM U ⊕
∗
a
T KM
U ) is a temporary key, a is a random number and DH = PHA mod p =
g ac mod p is the Diffie-Hellman key shared with the HA.

Step3. The smart card also computes DH 0 = PFa A modp = g ea mod p as
the Diffie-Hellman key shared with the FA. The MU then computes the
hash value H(TM U ⊕ RNM U ) and U = EDH 0 [M, F, IDHA , TM U , RNM U ], and
sends the login request message (A, H(TM U ⊕ RNM U ), U ) to FA over a public
channel.
2.3. Authentication phase
Step 1. After receiving the login request message from the MU, the FA
computes DH 0 = Ae mod p = g ea mod p and decrypts U using DH 0 to reveal
M, F, IDHA , TM U , RNM U . The FA now knows that the MU’s home agent is
HA.
Step 2. The FA verifies the validity of TM U . If it is valid, the FA computes
H(TM U ⊕ RNM U ) and compares this value with the received value to verify the validity of RNM U . In order to protect replay attacks,The FA stores
(IDM U , RNM U ) in its database. When the FA receives another login mes0
0
0
0
sage, say [A0 , H(TM
U ⊕ RNM U ), U ], it first retrieves random nonce RNM U
0
0
0
by decrypting U . If the timestamp TM U and the random nonce RNM U are
0
valid, the FA matches the retrieved RNM
U with the stored random nonce
RNM U corresponding to MU in its database. If the the two random numbers
match, the FA rejects this login request message. Otherwise, the FA replaces
0
the old random nonce RNM U by the new one RNM
U for the user MU in its
database.
b
mod p = g cb mod p
Step 3. The FA computes B = g b mod p and DH 00 = PHA
as the key shared with the HA, where b ∈ Zq is a secret random number generated by the FA. The FA acquires the current timestamp TF A and
generates a random nonce RNF A . The FA then computes a signature V =
SignSF A [H(AkBkM kF kTM U kRNM U kTF A kRNF A kCertF A )] where CertF A is
FA’s certificate and SF A is its private key, W = EDH 00 [A, B, M, F, TM U ,
RNM U , TF A , RNF A , V, CertF A ] and H(TF A ⊕ RNF A ). FA then sends the
message (B, H(TF A ⊕RNF A ), W ) to the HA.
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Step 4. HA computes DDH 00 [W ] = (A, B, M, F, TM U , RNM U , TF A , RNF A , V,
CertF A ), where DH 00 = B c mod p = g cb mod p. The HA verifies the validity
of TF A , RNF A , CertF A and FA’s signature V in turn. If these are valid,
the HA computes IDHA ⊕ DDH [M ] = EN [IDM U km] to reveal IDM U . By
searching IDM U in its database, the HA verify whether the MU is a legal
user or not.
Step 5. The HA computes L = H(TM U ⊕RNM U ⊕H(N kIDM U )) and decrypts
F using L to reveal TM U , RNM U , IDF A , A. The HA checks whether the
decrypted TM U , RNM U and IDF A are correct. If any value is invalid, the HA
notifies the FA that MU is not a legal user. Otherwise, the HA goes to the
next Step. In addition, the HA adopted the same method as in Step 2 of the
Authentication Phase to prevent replay attacks.
Step 6. The HA computes D = g x mod p and the session secret key shared
with the FA as SKF A,HA = B x mod p = g bx mod p, where x ∈ Zq is a
secret random number. Then, HA computes X = SignSHA [H(AkBkDkTHA
kRNM U kRNF A kCertHA )], where SHA is the private key of HA, and Y =
ESKF A,HA [H(H(N kIDM U )kD)kAkBkDkTHA kRNM U kRNF A kXkCertHA ]. HA
computes the secret session key shared with MU as SKM U,HA = Ax mod p =
g ax mod p. HA then sends the message (D, H(THA ⊕ RNM U ⊕ RNF A ), Y ) to
FA.
Step 7. FA computes SKF A,HA = Db mod p = g bx mod p and decrypts Y to
retrieve the information H(H(N kIDM U )kD), A, B, D, THA , RNM U , RNF A , X,
CertHA . The FA then verifies the validity of THA , RNM U , RNF A by using the
received H(THA ⊕ RNM U ⊕ RNF A ). If these are valid, FA verifies HA’s certificate CertHA and signature X. If they are also valid, FA proceeds to the
next Step.
Step 8. FA computes SKF A,M U = Ab mod p = g ab mod p and Z =
ESKF A,M U [T CertM U kH(H(N kIDM U )kD)kAkBkDkRNM U ] where T CertM U
is a temporary certificate for MU, and sends (B, H(RNM U ), Z) to MU.
Step 9. MU computes the secret session key shared with FA as SKM U,F A =
B a mod p = g ab mod p and decrypts Z to retrieve T CertM U , H(H(N kIDM U )kD),
A, B, D, RNM U . MU computes H(RNM U ) using RNM U generated in the login phase and compares it with the received hash value H(RNM U ). If they
match, MU verifies the certificate T CertM U using FA’s public key PF A . If
∗
it is valid, MU computes H(H(N kIDM U )kD) using its computed T KM
U =
H(N kIDM U ) in login phase and the retrieved value of D. If it matches with
5

the decrypted H(H(N kIDM U )kD), MU confirms that FA is verified by HA.
Then MU computes the session key SKM U,HA = Da mod p = g ax mod p
shared with the HA for future secure communication.
3. Security Analysis of Das’s scheme
3.1. Security against Impersonation
In this section, we show that Das’s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation
attacks if a user’s smart card is stolen and an attacker has extracted all the
information (T KM U , H(·), r, d, f ) stored in the smart card (e.g. by power
analysis [5, 10]). The attacker then impersonate the user MU as follows.
In login phase, the attacker acquires the current timestamp T ∗ and generates two random number RN ∗ , a∗ . He/she then computes the following values
∗
∗
a∗
T KM
mod p, L∗ = H(T ∗ ⊕ RN ∗ ⊕
U = T KM U ⊕ f = H(N kIDM U ), A = g
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
a∗
a∗ c
∗
mod p, M ∗ =
T KM
U ), F = EL∗ [T , RN , IDF A , A ], DH = PHA = g
0
∗
∗e
∗
a
a
∗
∗
∗
EDH ∗ [r], DH = PF A = g
mod p, U = EDH ∗0 [M , F , IDHA , T ∗ , RN ∗ ],
and sends the login request message (A∗ , H(T ∗ ⊕RN ∗ ), U ∗ ) to FA.
It is easy to see that the login request is in the correct format. Upon
receiving the request, FA and HA will execute the protocol normally and the
attacker will pass the authentication successfully. In the above attack, the
attacker needs to know the identity of the home agent HA. However, due
to the small number of home agents (compared with the number of mobile
users), the adversary can perform the attack simply by a brute-force search
on the possible home agents.
3.2. Security against Strong Replay Attack
In [3], Das claimed that timestamps are not an ideal solution to prevent replay attacks since replay attacks may still occur within the time period specified by the timestamps. He then proposed a new approach to avoid replay
attacks: FA and HA will store (IDM U , RNM U ) and {(IDM U , IDF A ), (RNM U ,
RNF A )} respectively in their databases. Later, when FA (or HA) receives a
new request, it will check if the random number in this new request is the
same as the one in its database. If they are the same, the request is identified
as a replay attack and will be rejected. Otherwise, the normal procedures
will be performed and the new random number will replace the old one in
the database.
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First of all, there is a mistake in Das’ scheme: such a procedure to prevent
replay attacks cannot be performed by FA since throughout the whole protocol the identity IDM U of a mobile user will never be revealed to FA. Secondly,
we believe such a strategy is still not strong enough to prevent replay attack
when considering the following attacking scenario: suppose MU executes two
sessions within a very short time interval such that the timestamp in the first
session is still valid when the second session has been completed. Since the
databases of FA and HA have been updated, the attacker can now replay the
first request in order to pass the authentication.
4. A New Smart Cased based Anonymous Authentication Protocol
We propose a new smart card based anonymous authentication protocol for wireless communications. Notably, the new protocol makes use of a
counter-based authentication mechanism to provide strong replay resistance.
The new protocol can also resist a range of attacks such as offline password
guessing attacks and impersonation attacks even if the smart card is stolen.
The system parameters p, q, g, G are the same as in Das’ scheme. Let
(PHA = g c , SHA = c) and (PF A = g e , SF A = e) denote the public and
private keys of HA and FA respectively. The new protocol has four phases:
registration, login, authentication, and password change.
4.1. Registration phase
1). The MU chooses his/her own identity IDM U and password P WM U ,
and generates a large random number d. He/she then computes the hash
value f = H(IDM U kP WM U kd), and sends the registration message IDM U , f
to the HA via a secure channel.
2). Upon receiving the request, HA computes T KM U = H(N kIDM U ) ⊕ f
using its own master secret key N , and r = IDHA ⊕ EN [IDM U km], where
m is a random value which is different for each mobile user. HA then initiates a counter ctrM U = 0 for MU and creates a record (IDM U , ctrM U ) in its
database. HA then issues a smart card to M U which contains (T KM U , H(·), r,
ctrM U ) over a secure channel.
3). Upon receiving the smart card, MU computes the hash value f ∗ =
H(IDM U ⊕ P WM U ⊕ d), and stores f ∗ , d in the smart card. So the smart
card contains (T KM U , H(·), r, ctrM U , f ∗ , d).

7

4.2. Login phase
1). MU first inserts his/her smart card into the device and then enters
∗
his/her identity IDM U and password P WM
U . The smart card then computes
0
∗0
∗
f = H(IDM U ⊕ P WM U ⊕ d) and verifies the condition f ∗ = f ∗ using the
stored value of f ∗ . If the equation holds, the smart card ensures that MU
enters his/her identity and password correctly and proceed to the next step.
Otherwise, the login phase is terminated immediately.
∗
2). The smart card computes T KM
U = T KM U ⊕ H(IDM U kP WM U kd) =
H(N kIDM U ), ctrM U = ctrM U + 1, A = g a mod p, F = EL [ctrM U , IDF A , A],
∗
M = EDH [r], where L = H(ctrM U ⊕ T KM
U ) is a temporary key, a ∈ Zq is a
a
ac
random number and DH = PHA = g mod p is a Diffie-Hellman key shared
with HA.
3). The smart card also computes DH 0 = PFa A = g ea mod p as the DiffieHellman key shared with FA, and U = EDH 0 [M, F, IDHA , ctrM U ], and sends
the login request message (A, U ) to FA over a public channel.
4.3. Authentication phase
Upon receiving the login request message (A, U ) from the MU, the FA
and the HA perform the following steps.
1). FA computes DH 0 = Ae = g ea mod p and decrypts U using DH 0 to
recover M, F, IDHA , ctrM U . Then FA knows that MU’s home agent is HA.
2). F A → HA : (B, W ). FA computes B = g b mod p and DH 00 =
b
PHA = g cb mod p as the key shared with the HA, where b ∈ Zq is a random
number generated by the FA. FA then computes V = SignSF A [H(AkBkM kF
kCertF A kctrM U )] and W = EDH 00 [A, B, M, F, V, CertF A , ctrM U ], where SF A
is the private key of FA and CertF A is its certificate. Then FA sends the
message (B, W ) to HA.
3). Upon receiving the message (B, W ) from FA, HA computes DDH 00 [W ] =
(A, B, M, F, V, CertF A , ctrM U ), where DH 00 = B c = g cb mod p. The HA
verifies CertF A and FA’s signature V using FA’s public key PF A included
in CertF A . If they are valid, the HA computes DN [IDHA ⊕ DDH [M ]] =
IDM U km to recover IDM U . By matching IDM U in its database, the HA
verify whether the MU is a legal user or not. If IDM U doesn’t exist then HA
notifies FA that MU is not a legal user.
4). HA computes L = H(ctrM U ⊕ H(N kIDM U )) and decrypts F using L
to recover (ctrM U , IDF A , A). HA checks whether the decrypted ctrM U , A and
IDF A are same as the received ctrM U , A and the identity of FA in CertF A .
If the verification fails, HA notifies FA that the user authentication fails.
8
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Figure 1: Message Flows in Authentication Phase.

In order to prevent replay attacks, the HA also verifies the retrieved ctrM U
0
0
with the stored counter ctrM
U corresponding to IDM U . If ctrM U > ctrM U
0
then the HA replaces ctrM U with ctrM U in its database and proceeds to the
next step. Otherwise, HA notifies FA that the user authentication fails.
5). HA → F A : (D, Y ). The HA computes D = g x mod p and the
session secret key shared with the FA as SKF A,HA = B x = g bx mod p
where x ∈ Zq is a random number generated by HA. HA then computes
X = SignSHA [H(AkBkDkCertHA )] and Y = ESKF A,HA [H(H(N kIDM U )kA
kBkD)kAkBkDkXkCertHA ] where SHA is the private key of the HA and
CertHA is its certificate. HA also computes the secret session key shared
with MU as SKM U,HA = Ax = g ax mod p. HA then sends the message
(D, Y ) to FA.
6). Upon receiving the message (D, Y ) from HA. FA computes SKF A,HA =
Db = g bx mod p and decrypts Y to recover the values H(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD),
A, B, D, X, CertHA . FA verifies HA’s certificate CertHA and signature X. If
they are valid, FA proceeds to the next Step.
7). F A → M U : (B, Z). FA computes SKF A,M U = Ab = g ab mod p
and Z = ESKF A,M U [CertF A kT CertM U kH(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD)kAkBkD],
where T CertM U is a temporary certificate for MU. FA then sends (B, Z) to
the MU.
8). MU computes the secret session key shared with the FA as SKM U,F A =
B a = g ab mod p and uses it to decrypt Z to recover T CertM U , H(H(N kIDM U )
kAkBkD), A, B, D. The MU then verifies CertF A and the temporary certificate T CertM U using the public key PF A of FA. If the verification is success∗
ful, MU computes H(T KM
U kAkBkD) and compares it with the decrypted
H(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD). If the two values are equal, MU accepts the session and computes SKM U,HA = Da = g ax mod p as the session key shared
with HA.
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4.4. Password change phase
1) MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and enters his/her idenold
tity IDM U and old password P WM
U.
0
old
2) The smart card computes f ∗ = H(IDM U ⊕ P WM
U ⊕ d) and veri0
∗
∗
∗
fies the condition f = f using the stored f . If the equation does not
hold, the smart card rejects the password change request. Otherwise, MU
00
new
enters his/her new password P WM
The smart card computes f ∗ =
U.
new
new
old
old
H(IDM U ⊕ P WM
U ⊕ d) and T KM U = T KM U ⊕ H(IDM U kP WM U kd) ⊕
new
old
∗
new
∗00
H(IDM U kP WM U kd), and replaces the old values of (T KM U , f ) with (T KM
U,f )
respectively.
5. Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme can resist different
types of attacks and provide user anonymity.
5.1. User Anonymity
From Figure 1, we can see that the communication transcript reveals
no information about the identity IDM U of the user. First of all, A =
g a , B = g b , D = g x are all random numbers which are not related to IDM U .
Secondly, U, W, Y and Z are all ciphertexts encrypted under different DiffieHellman keys. Because of the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem,
the adversary is unable to decrypt U, W, Y or Z to recover the encrypted
message.
From the view point of the foreign agent FA, it can decrypt U to recover
(M, F, IDHA , ctrM U ) and decrypt Y to recover (H(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD),
A, B, D, X, CertHA ). Since M and F are ciphertexts which can only be decrypted by HA, FA will not learn any information about IDM U from these
values. Also, since the hash function H is one-way, FA cannot learn the identity of MU from H(H(N kIDM U )AkBkkD). Finally, X = SignSHA [H(AkBkD
kCertHA )] also reveals no information about IDM U to FA. Therefore, the foreign agent is not able to recover the identity of MU.
5.2. Security against Impersonation
We consider three types of impersonation attacks, namely MU impersonation attack, FA impersonation attack, and HA impersonation attack.
MU Impersonation. In order to impersonate the MU, the adversary must
obtain the value of H(N kIDM U ). We then consider two situations: (1) the
10

adversary compromises the user identity and password but the smart card is
secure; and (2) the adversary compromises the smart card but the the user
identity and password are secure.
In the first case, it is obvious that adversary is unable to obtain the value
of H(N kIDM U ) since the smart card is secure. Notice that H(N kIDM U )
is concealed in T KM U = H(N kIDM U ) ⊕ H(IDM U kP WM U kd) in the smart
card. Since the smart card is secure, the adversary is unable to obtain T KM U
or H(N kIDM U ).
In the second case, when the smart card is stolen and compromised, the
adversary can learn the values of (T KM U , H(·), r, ctrM U , f ∗ , d) in the smart
card. However, this time the adversary knows neither IDM U nor P WM U , and
again she cannot compute the value of H(N kIDM U ). We must also consider
offline password guessing attacks in this case, that is the adversary uses
a brute force search to find out the correct password. In the proposed anonymous authentication scheme, the user identity is protected against outsiders
and the FA, this can help prevent the password guessing attack. Since there
can be a huge number of users in the mobile system, it is infeasible for an
adversary to do an exhaustive search for all the possible (ID, password) pairs.
However, we remark that if the user ID space is small, then offline password
guessing attack would become feasible if the smart card of a user is stolen
and compromised by the attacker.
It is worth noting that FA can also learn the value of (H(H(N kIDM U )kA
kBkD) in the authentication phase. However, due to the one-wayness of the
hash function, FA is unable to obtain the value of H(N kIDM U ).
FA/HA Impersonation. Since FA and HA uses digital signatures to authenticate each other, the adversary is unable to impersonate either of them due
to the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. Also, it is infeasible for
FA to impersonate HA to the mobile user since the mobile user will verify
the message (H(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD) in order to make sure that the value
of D is indeed generated by the HA.
5.3. Strong Replay Resistance
We have used the counter based authentication mechanism to prevent
replay attacks. The advantage of using this mechanism compared with the
timestamp approach is that we don’t require different parties in the system
to maintain a synchronized clock. It also can prevent the replay attack
presented in Section 3.2.
11

It is obvious that if the adversary replays the first or second message, then
HA will detect the attack when examining the counter ctrM U of the user MU.
For third and fourth messages, we used the challenge-response mechanism to
prevent replay attack. In the third message, the signature X is generated
by HA based on the challenge B sent by FA, and in the fourth message, the
authentication token (H(H(N kIDM U )kAkBkD) is generated based on the
challenge A sent by MU. Therefore, the adversary cannot replay any message
in the protocol.
5.4. Secure Key Establishment and Forward Secrecy
At the end of the protocol, the MU will establish a session key SKM U,F A =
a
B = g ab mod p with FA, and another session key SKM U,HA = Da =
g ax mod p with HA. Since all the messages are protected against impersonation and replay attacks, the MU can guarantee that the session keys are
established with the intended peer entities. Due to the intractability of the
Diffie-Hellman problem, the adversary is unable to derive any session key
from the values of A, B, D.
It is also worth noting that the proposed protocol achieves perfect forward
secrecy. Since the values of A, B, D are freshly generated in each session, all
the past session keys will remain secure even if the long-terms secret keys are
compromised at a later stage.
6. Performance Comparison
We compare our new scheme with two recently proposed smart card based
anonymous user authentication schemes due to Das [3] and Li et al. [9]. In
Table 2, we provide the comparison based on the key security and usability
features of these schemes, while in Table 3, we compare their efficiency.
From the tables, we can see that our proposed scheme provides better
security and usability than the other two schemes. In particular, one special
feature of our scheme is that we don’t require all the parties (namely MU, FA,
and HA) in the system to maintain a synchronized clock. This is important
in the wireless roaming scenario since clients and servers in different domains
may use different clocks. Therefore, our scheme is more scalable than the
previous schemes.

12

Feature
Li et al. [9]
Correct Password Update
No
Server Knows No Password
Yes
No Synchronized Clock
No
User Anonymity
Yes
Mutual Authentication
Yes
Strong Replay Resistance
No
Key Agreement
Yes
Forward Secrecy
Yes

Das [3]
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Ours
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 2: Security and Usability Comparison

Li et al. [9] Das [3]
Modular Exponentiation
6+6pre∗
6+6pre
Hash Operation
10
15
Symmetric-key Encryption
6
6
Symmetric-key Decryption
7
7
Signature Generation
2
2
Signature Verification
2
2
* pre denotes pre-computation
Table 3: Efficiency Comparison
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Ours
6+6pre
10
6
7
2
2

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed some security flaws in a recently proposed smart
card based anonymous user authentication scheme. We also proposed a new
scheme which can achieve stronger security and better usability than the
existing schemes without sacrificing efficiency. Our scheme does not require
entities in different domains to maintain a synchronized clock, and hence is
more suitable for wireless roaming networks.
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